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Abstract
Following J.-Y.Béziau in his pioneer work on non-standard interpreta-
tions of the traditional square of opposition, we have applied the abstract
structure of the square to study the relation of opposition between states
in superposition in orthodox quantum mechanics in [1]. Our conclusion
was that such states are contraries (i.e. both can be false, but both cannot
be true), contradicting previous analyzes that have led to different results,
such as those claiming that those states represent contradictory properties (i.
e. they must have opposite truth values). In this chapter we bring the issue
once again into the center of the stage, but now discussing the metaphys-
ical presuppositions which underlie each kind of analysis and which lead
to each kind of result, discussing in particular the idea that superpositions
represent potential contradictions. We shall argue that the analysis accord-
ing to which states in superposition are contrary rather than contradictory
is still more plausible.
Key-words: contradiction; superposition; potentiality; contrariety; opposi-
tion.
1 Introduction
J.-Y.Béziau has advanced the thesis that the square of opposition is a general
framework that may be profitably employed for conceptual analysis (e.g. in
Béziau [4]). Almost any kind of opposition between propositions may be prof-
itably studied by the conceptual machinery furnished by the square, so that
the proper relationships between the propositions in question may be brought
to light and further analyzed. In this sense, the traditional opposition between
Aristotelian categorical propositions is but one of the many interpretations of
the abstract structure of the square.
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Bearing these multiple interpretations in sight, one of the possible uses of
the square concerns application in the case of quantum superpositions. States
in quantum mechanics such as the one describing the famous Schrödinger cat
— which is in a superposition between the states “the cat is dead” and “the
cat is alive” — present a challenge for our understanding which may be ap-
proached via the conceptual tools provided by the square. According to some
interpretations, such states represent contradictory properties of a system (for
one such interpretation see, for instance, da Costa and de Ronde [6]). On the
other hand, we have advanced the thesis that states such as “the cat is dead”
and “the cat is alive” are contrary rather than contradictory (see Arenhart and
Krause [1], [2]).
To keep the paper self-contained, we now recall the traditional definitions
of the oppositions which shall be employed in this paper and that are used in
the discussions of applications of the square:
Contradiction Propositions α and β are contradictory when both cannot be
true and both cannot be false.
Contrariety Propositions α and β are contrary when both cannot be true, but
both can be false.
Subcontrariety Propositions α and β are subcontraries when both can be true,
but both cannot be false.
Subaltern Proposition α is subaltern to proposition β if the truth of β implies
the truth of α
Subalterns are not in any sense in a relation of opposition, but rather a kind of
implication. Anyway, they are part of the traditional discussions of the square
and so are usually included in the non-standard approaches to the square.
In this chapter we shall once again engage in the discussion by presenting
some further differences between the two approaches to superposition, viz.,
the one that considers them as contradictions and the one that considers them
as contraries. In the next section we present in outline both approaches, the
one which considers quantum states of a superposition as contradictory and as
contrary, so that our discussion can be self-contained. In section 3 we discuss
the relation between contradiction and potential properties. It is said that the
analysis of superposition as contradictory holds when such a state is thought
as a superposition of potential properties, so we analyze this claim. In section
4 we investigate whether a concept of potentiality can sit comfortably with a
notion of contradiction. In view of the previous discussions, we conclude by
defending the idea that contrariety is still a more adequate way to understand
superpositions.
2 Contradictions and contrariety in superpositions
The proper understanding of superpositions is an open challenge typical of
most of quantum mechanical conceptual innovations. Typically, to address the
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problem an interpretation of the theory is offered, and along with it, the hopes
that the difficulties that are generated by superpositions in quantum mechan-
ics get a proper explanation. As is well known, Dirac [9, p.12] claimed that
superposition is not reducible to any classical notion, it is a sui generis feature
of quantum mechanics: it lies behind most of the applications of the theory,
and represents somehow the essence of the novelties brought by quantum me-
chanics.
In a recent paper, da Costa and de Ronde [6] proposed to deal with superpo-
sitions by adhering to a completely innovative approach to the superpositions
and, as a result of such move, by adjusting the underlying logic with which
we discuss such issues: according to their proposal, a superposition involves
in general contradictory properties, and the underlying logic for the discussion
of those issues is a paraconsistent logic. Indeed, it is usually said that paracon-
sistent logics deal with contradictions without allowing trivialization.1
To take an example that illustrates the main thesis, consider a spin- 12 system
which is in the state | ↑z〉. Now, when we change the direction and consider
the x axis, this state is in a superposition between | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉. Each of
these states corresponds to a projector operator | ↑x〉〈↑x | and | ↓x〉〈↓x |, re-
spectively, with each projector representing a propriety of the system (in this
case, “to have spin up in the x direction” and “to have spin down in the x di-
rection”, respectively). Now, according to da Costa and de Ronde [6, p.848],
these properties “which constitute the superposition and must be considered
simultaneously are in general contradictory properties”.
So, it seems that the idea is very simple. Two properties such as “to have
spin up” and “to have spin down” (from now on, the context should make it
clear that they are being taken in the same spatial direction), when their cor-
responding states are in a superposition, are said to be contradictory. Further-
more, they are not actual properties of the system, but rather possible or po-
tential properties (more about this in the next section, see also de Ronde [8]).
Then, potentially, the system has contradictory properties (see da Costa and de
Ronde loc. cit.). According to them, this fact must be dealt with by a paraconsis-
tent approach, that is, we must adopt a paraconsistent logic as the underlying
logic (see [6, sec.5]).
Obviously, if two properties are to be thought of as contradictory, then one
must make clear what is the meaning of contradiction. We attempted such an
explanation in [1]. Indeed, if “spin up” and “spin down”, or else (taking into
account Schrödinger’s cat) “cat dead” and “cat alive” are to be understood as
contradictory, then this contradictoriness must be spelled out. To spell out this
fact by using the traditional definition of contradiction of the square of oppo-
sition results in the fact that such attribution of properties must always have
well defined truth values: recalling that contradictory propositions have op-
1In a nutshell: in classical logic, in the presence of a contradiction any proposition whatever
may be said derivable, and the resulting system is called trivial. In paraconsistent systems, on
the other hand, even if expressions formally representing contradictions are derivable, not every
proposition is also derivable, so that the system is not trivial. For the details see [7], and also the
discussion in Béziau [3], [5].
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posed truth values, the system must have spin up and not have spin down, or
else have spin down and not have spin up. However, this was obviously not
the idea behind the claim that we must “consider simultaneously” those prop-
erties. It is simply impossible to take them simultaneously and still keep them
as contradictories when “contradiction” is understood in the terms provided
by the traditional definition of the square.
Then, an analysis through the square seems to provide for an obstacle for
the consideration of contradictory properties in a superposition. What alterna-
tive do we have? One could, perhaps, insist in a paraconsistent approach along
the following lines. Let us consider properties such as “to have spin up” and
“to have spin down” as being somehow one the paraconsistent negation of the
other. Then, following the suggestion of the paraconsistent approach, we could
explain how both can be taken as true of a system. Indeed, when the system
is in a superposition we would have something of the form α ∧ ¬α, a true con-
tradiction. However, this move would not do. First of all, an expression such
as α ∧ ¬α is not a contradiction in a paraconsistent logic, strictly speaking. As
philosophical analyzes have made it clear (see for instance Béziau [3] and [5]),
paraconsistent negations represent subcontrariety, that is, when ¬ is taken as
paraconsistent negation, α and ¬α are subcontraries, not really contradictories.
This move would at best amount to a change in terminology (see also Aren-
hart and Krause [2]). Second, subcontrariety requires that both propositions
involved can be true but both cannot be false. So, by adopting this view, one
would be obliged to accept that in a superposition, at least one of the proper-
ties corresponding to the states in superposition always hold. This, however, is
still weaker than the requirement that both always be the case. Furthermore, it
is not clear whether this assumption does not violate some form of no-go the-
orems that prohibit such kind of property attribution in quantum mechanics.
We have suggested an alternative route in [1]: to take common wisdom
seriously and claim, following Dirac, that a superposition represents a new
state of the system, one in which the system, as far as we know, does not have
any of the properties involved. To explain how to account for superpositions
according to this analysis, let us consider once again the case of the spin- 12
system, as an electron in the | ↑z〉 state. When we inquire about what happens
in the x direction, then the system is in a superposition between | ↑x〉 and
| ↓x〉. Now, instead of allowing that the system has both associated properties
| ↑x〉〈↑x | and | ↓x〉〈↓x |, we say that the system does not have any of the
properties. In this sense, it can be false that the system has “spin up” and it
can be false that the system has “spin down”. However, if it is the case that the
system has one of the properties (e.g. spin up), then it does not have the other
(spin down). This situation describes precisely contrary propositions. So, the
case of such superpositions involves an opposition, but it is not contradiction,
but rather contrariety.
Notice that this view does not rule out interpretations such as versions of
the modal interpretation (see Lombardi and Dieks [11]). It could be the case
that the system, even if it is in a superposition, does have one of the associated
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properties (modal interpretations, recall, break the eigenstate-eigenvalue link).
However, as we mentioned, in this case, contrariety is still preserved, because
only one of the properties is the case, while the other is not. In fact, modal
interpretations seem to be incompatible with any kind of approach to superpo-
sition in which the states in superposition correspond to properties that must
be taken simultaneously.
Now, even though this seems to be very plausible (to our minds, at least),
the approach that considers that states in superposition are contrary does seem
to take into account some assumptions about property instantiation that a para-
consistentist may deny. Indeed, de Ronde [8] has approached the subject fol-
lowing these lines. According to this line of reasoning, to consider that states
in superposition are contraries but not contradictories involves assuming an
orthodox metaphysical view, which includes the assumption that quantum
mechanics describes entities and how they bear properties. The paraconsis-
tent approach, on the other hand, should be understood as taking properties
as potentialities, following a completely different metaphysical approach. We
shall explore the different metaphysical views underlying the paraconsistent
approach in the next two sections.
3 Potentiality and contradiction
As we have mentioned by the end of the previous section, perhaps two distinct
kinds of metaphysical assumptions underlie the two analyzes proposed for the
case of quantum superposition. As we have suggested, there may be a different
set of metaphysical presuppositions making the job in each case, and these
presuppositions may well be incompatible. So, in order to make things clearer,
in this section we shall discuss a little more the suggestion that distinct modes
of being underlie each kind of analysis, mainly by trying to bring to light the
idea of potentiality that accompanies the paraconsistent approach.
As da Costa and de Ronde [6] and de Ronde [8] have suggested, systems
described by states in a superposition are such that they have only potentially
or possibly the properties associated with each state. More than that, those
properties, as we have already quoted, must be taken simultaneously and are
thought of as contradictory. Now, the main question is: what are possible prop-
erties or potencies and how they can be contradictory?
Let us begin by exploring the idea of a contradiction in the potential realm.
Once we admit that reality is divided in two spheres, the actual and the poten-
tial (or possible), both equally real, we may have contradictions in both. Given
that superpositions are existent only in the potential realm, we may concern
ourselves only with this case. The first point we shall raise concerns terminol-
ogy: possibility and potentiality are treated as synonymous, it seems, by the
paraconsistent approach. However, “possible” here has two distinct senses. In
the most straightforward sense, it is said of a proposition that it is possible,
while in the intended sense we are discussing, it is said of a property that it is
possible. It is obviously the second sense that is being used here: possibility
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regarding properties. However, in its traditional use, a possible property, also
called a modal property, is understood as a property that an object does not have,
but could have. It is a useful notion, for instance, in the metaphysical discussion
concerning the numerical difference (or identity) of a statue and the piece of
clay of which it is made: if modal properties are admitted as legitimate prop-
erties in this case, then the statue is different from the piece of clay. Clearly, the
statute could not be squashed and still be the same, while the piece of clay could
be squashed and still be the same (see Lowe [12]).
Now, if this analysis of a possible property is correct, then we are entitled
to understand potential properties as metaphysicians have traditionally un-
derstood modal properties. However, if the properties corresponding to the
states in a superposition are modal properties of the system, then there can be
no contradiction between them. Indeed, once again consider the case of the
electron in | ↑z〉. When we are concerned with the x direction, the system is
in a superposition between | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉, and both properties | ↑x〉〈↑x | and
| ↓x〉〈↓x | are possible (modal) properties. However, if it is correct to associate
possible properties with modal properties, then these are properties the system
does not actually have. In this case, then, it is difficult to understand how they
can be contradictory; both simply fail to be properties of the system, and as a
bonus, our suggestion that they are merely contraries applies (recall section 2).
So, modal properties, even though they may be related to potential prop-
erties, will not work. Let us leave modal properties behind for now and keep
with the same line of inquiry, but now turning our attention to “potential prop-
erty”. It happens that one can advance a very similar argument. Traditionally,
potential is understood as being in straight opposition to actual (more on this
in the next section). However, once again, a potential property is one which is
not actually possessed by the system (by definition). In a superposition, when
we identify the properties corresponding to the states in the superposition as
potential properties in this sense (i.e. as opposed to actual), then, those are
properties not possessed by the system. Again, there is no contradiction in this
case, but only mere contrariety.
Perhaps through these analyzes we are still considering the potential and
the possible too closely related to actuality and actualization. What if we con-
sider potentiality as a separated realm completely independent of any entity in
which it exerts its actualization? Could this independence somehow help us in
attributing some sense to the idea that a contradiction is real in this realm? It is
this suggestion that we now investigate.
The first point of the suggestion seems to be that properties are potential all
by themselves. In this sense, they are independent of their possible attribution
to a system. That is, a property is not possible because it is the modal or po-
tential property of any specific system, but rather it is an independent power,
existent by itself. In this sense, powers like “spin up” and “spin down” are
contradictory. But it is even more difficult to make sense of contradiction here.
As far as contradiction is defined by the square of opposition, or even in
other contexts, it involves some kind of affirmation and some kind of negation.
Also, it involves truth and falsehood. Both, broadly understood, are missing in
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the completely independent understanding of contradictory properties.
First of all, a property, taken by itself as a power (a real entity not actual), is
not affirmed nor denied of anything. To take properties such as “to have spin
up in the x direction” and “to have spin down in the x direction” by themselves
does not affirm nor deny anything. To say “to have spin up in the x direction”
is not even a statement, it is analogous to speak “green” or “red hair”. To speak
of a contradiction, it seems, one must have complete statements, where proper-
ties or relations are attributed to something. That is, one must have something
like “spin up is measured in a given direction”, or “Mary is red haired”, oth-
erwise there will be no occasion for truth and falsehood, and consequently, no
occasion for a contradiction. So, the realm of the potential must be also a realm
of attribution of properties to something if contradiction is to enter in it. How-
ever, this idea of attribution of properties seems to run counter the idea of a
merely potential realm. On the other hand, the idea of a contradiction seems
to require that we speak about truth and falsehood.
Second, perhaps we can make clearer the idea of contradictory properties
by analyzing the formal approach to contradictions advanced by da Costa and
de Ronde. In [6, p.855] it is provided for a paraconsistent set theory ZF1 in
which superpositions are formalized. Let us consider a system S which is in a
superposition of states s1 and s2, both “classically incompatible”. A predicate
symbol K(S, s1) is introduced in the language of ZF1 by da Costa and de Ronde
to represent the predicate that “S has the superposition predicate associated
with s1”. The same reading holds with obvious adaptation for K(S, s2) and
similarly for ¬K(S, s1) and ¬K(S, s2), where ¬ is a paraconsistent negation.
Now, with the help of these predicate symbols the Postulate of Contradiction is
introduced: when S is in a superposition of s1 and s2, we have
K(S, s1) ∧ ¬K(S, s1) ∧ K(S, s2) ∧ ¬K(S, s2).
This postulate somehow represents the situation in a superposition.
Now, let us apply this postulate to our former example of an electron (our
system S) in | ↑z〉 which in the x direction is in a superposition of the states
| ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉 (our states corresponding to s1 and s2). The Postulate of Contra-
diction now reads:
K(S, | ↑x〉) ∧ ¬K(S, | ↑x〉) ∧ K(S, | ↓x〉) ∧ ¬K(S, | ↓x〉).
But as we have remarked in [1], the contradiction now comes from the postula-
tion of K(S, | ↑x〉) ∧ ¬K(S, | ↑x〉), not from any relation between | ↑x〉〈↑x | and
| ↓x〉〈↓x |. Anyway, let us concede this point and accept that a superposition
is inconsistent because it involves things like K(S, | ↑x〉) ∧ ¬K(S, | ↑x〉). There
are some difficulties with this move.
To begin with, this attribution of contradiction requires that there is a sys-
tem S which both has “spin up” and does not have “spin up”. This is clearly
an actualist reading of property attribution, in the sense that the system has ac-
tually the property and actually does not have it. Indeed, this is a contradiction
in the actual world. So, in this sense, the Postulate violates the requirement
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that the properties in a superposition be only potential in order to build a con-
tradiction. This move clearly goes against the main motivation to consider the
properties of a superposition as potential.
But what if we count such an attribution as merely potential? We could
try to read K(S, s1) as “the system S potentially has the predicate associated
with s1”. Now, an ambiguity enters the stage in the case of negation. If this
suggestion is correct, when we try to read ¬K(S, s1) we have two options. The
first one reads “the system S does not have potentially the predicate associated
with s1”, understood as meaning that it is not potentially that the system has
this property, it rather has it actually. The second reading is “it is not the case
that the system S has potentially the predicate associated with s1”, that is, it is
false that S is potentially s1. Both readings are problematic.
The first reading is obviously troublesome when we consider the Postulate
of Contradiction: it says both that S has the predicates associated with s1 and
s2 both potentially and actually. However, as the case of the electron illustrates,
the system would have to be both “spin up” and “spin down” in the potential
realm and in the actual realm, which, at least in the last case, is impossible.
The second reading is also problematic for the approach. Indeed, since the mo-
tivation for approaching superpositions as contradictions was by considering
properties in a superposition simultaneously, there seems to be no reason to
consider them as holding simultaneously, even if potentially, and then deny
that they hold simultaneously, even if potentially. That is, the introduction of
a negation read as denying that the system has a given property potentially
simply does not make sense if the idea was to represent a superposition as at-
tributing both properties to the system (even if potentially). In this sense, the
Postulate of Inconsistency does not seem to represent the intuition behind the
paraconsistency approach to superpositions.
However, it may be the case that a paraconsistent set theory is just an in-
adequate formalism to capture the idea of a potential property, and a language
involving an operator whose role is to represent potential property attribution
could help us better in this task. Our next section shall investigate the prospects
of this move.
4 Potentiality and oppositions
What if the difficulties presented above come from distinct senses of “contra-
diction”? Perhaps the contradiction as represented in the traditional square is
not the same as a contradiction for potential properties. In this section we shall
discuss a little more the idea of a potential property by employing the square
of opposition. Throughout this section, we shall introduce a special operator
♦ to represent potentiality. In this sense, ♦p means that “p is potential”. Now,
of course we must deal with p as representing potential property attribution to
something, in general, to an already given system.
First of all, to establish the terminology, one could begin by distinguishing
two distinct ways the operator may represent potential property attribution
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that could, both, represent the case of superposition. Let us suppose that s1
and s2 are in a superposition and let us concede in using s1 and s2 ambiguously
both for the states as for the statements that the system is in the corresponding
state. In a first reading of the situation, we could understand this situation as
represented by the formula ♦(s1 ∧ s2) or as (♦s1 ∧ ♦s2). We shall argue that
only the second reading is a sensible reading of a superposition, and that it is
difficult to understand any of both statements as contradictory.2
Consider first the second statement, (♦s1 ∧ ♦s2). If this is the intended
meaning of the claim that a superposition involves potentiality, then clearly
there is no contradiction in it. There is a simple analog in classical modal logic
with the statement (♦p ∧ ♦¬p). Notice that it is possible for some proposition
to be the case and it is possible for it not to be the case, and this is different from
the contradictory statement (♦p∧¬♦p). It is this last statement we would need
to represent a contradiction, but this is clearly not the case in a superposition,
that is, we do not have (♦s1 ∧ ¬♦s1). Indeed, no one would claim that a state
in a superposition stands for a potential property of the system and then try to
represent such thing by including the information that it also does not stand for
a potential property of the system. That move, we believe, renders the project of
introducing potential properties in the discussion senseless.
However, one may complain that this reading of potentiality is not the in-
tended meaning at all. This meaning, it could be argued, behaves too close to
classical potentiality, it does represent at best the relation of a potential prop-
erty coming to actuality, and is not the real quantum potentiality (see de Ronde
[8]), which is pure potentiality independently of actuality. In this case, it is the
first reading of ♦, as it appears in ♦(s1 ∧ s2) that represents a superposition. If
this is the case, then some further difficulties arise.
First of all, taken by itself, this does not represent a contradiction in the
sense of the square. Indeed, one needs two statements in order to have such
a contradiction. Perhaps the meaning of contradiction is different, as we have
already suggested in the beginning of this section, in the sense that the para-
consistentist wishes that this formula be a logical contradiction, a formula that
is always false (as defined in traditional logic textbooks). But what is the use
in quantum mechanics of a formula that is always false? Furthermore, is it re-
ally the case that ♦(s1 ∧ s2) is always false? Not really, in any standard version
of normal modal logic this formula would represent a contingent statement,
while in non-normal modal logic it would be always true in the non-normal
worlds, for instance, due to the peculiar semantical understanding of♦ in those
worlds (see Hughes and Cresswell [10]). So, to tackle this issue seriously one
must provide the axioms or rules for the operator ♦, which we have been un-
derstanding only informally till now.
However, instead of advancing a formal analysis of the operator ♦, we shall
now investigate different meanings it could have and see how well they fare
in relation to the idea that ♦(s1 ∧ s2) is a potential contradiction, or, a contra-
2We have our doubts about the possibility of representing a superposition this way, in particu-
lar, in reading the + sign of a superposition as a conjunction, but we shall do that for the purposes
of argumentation in this section (see also [1]).
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diction in the potential realm. To fix our ideas, let us keep with the case of the
electron whose state is a superposition of | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉. So, if the idea is that
♦(s1 ∧ s2) represents a contradiction in the potential realm, in our example that
means that potentially our system has both spin up and spin down. Obviously,
no system has actually both spin up and spin down.
Now, this raises some important questions. First of all, what is the relation
of the operator ♦ with actuality? Let us introduce for simplicity an operator
@ for actuality. One could think at first that actuality and potentiality are mu-
tually incompatible: when something is potential it is not actual, and when it
is actual, then it is not potential. In this sense, the statements ♦p and @p are
contradictory, in the sense of the square. However, if this is a sensible read-
ing, notice that even though ♦(spin up and spin down), we never have @(spin
up and spin down). In this sense, the postulated contradiction in the potential
realm never gets actualized, it does not work for actual entities. That leaves the
contradiction in the potential realm unmotivated, and makes the reading of a
superposition as (♦ spin up and ♦ spin down) much more plausible, without
the need for a contradiction, once again. That is, since the alleged contradic-
tion is not doing any physical and any metaphysical work, we may plausibly
leave it behind. Some people call it an application of Priest’s razor, the meta-
physical principle according to which we should not populate the world with
contradictions beyond necessity (see Priest [14] and Arenhart and Krause [1]
for a related discussion of this principle in the same context).
For a second possibility, let us consider that ♦ and @ are not contradic-
tory, but are somehow compatible, in the sense that potential properties may
also be actual and vice versa. In this sense, ♦p and @p represent rather sub-
contrary statements, not contradictory statements. Indeed, according to this
reading, any property must be either actual or potential (both cannot be false),
but some properties can be both actual and potential (both can be true). Our
main difficulty with this interpretation is once again the lack of motivation for
introducing the claim that ♦( spin up and spin down) represents a contradic-
tion and to prefer this reading of a superposition instead of (♦ spin up and
♦ spin down), which is not contradictory in any sense. Because even though
some simple properties may be understood as being both actual and potential,
this is clearly not the case for quantum properties such as spin up and spin
down: that is, even if one accepts that potentially the system can be both si-
multaneously, actually that never occurs. So, this reading would provide for a
distinct understanding of the relation between ♦ and @ which saves the postu-
lation of a contradiction in potentiality, but it still does not help motivating the
postulation.
Obviously, our proposal is not that both ♦p and @p could both be false,
generating a kind of limbo between actuality and potentiality, but rather that
if one is going to concede that some kind of potentiality must be introduced
to account for superpositions (notice the conditional), then perhaps the best
way to understand that potentiality in relation to superposition is by leaving
♦(s1 ∧ s2) behind and sticking to (♦s1 ∧ ♦s2). In this sense, we can still grant
that a superposition represents a state in which not both properties are actual,
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that is, it is not the case that (@s1 ∨ @s2) must be necessarily true. The case
is left open whether one or the other obtains, but the issue depends on some
interpretational details that we shall present very briefly in the next section.
5 Conclusion: contrariety again
We hope we have made it clear that even though a paraconsistent approach to
quantum superpositions is viable and defensible, it is still hard to see it as well
motivated by the theory. Furthermore, there are some difficulties related with
the very idea that a paraconsistent logic deals with contradictions stricto sensu
as well as with the idea that superpositions are indeed contradictory (for the
first difficulty, see again Béziau [3], [5] and for the second see section 2 and [1]).
Now, to consider that a superposition is better understood as a contrari-
ety still leaves some issues open. It is a position compatible with very weak
requirements on quantum mechanics. Let us make the issue clearer. We take
it as a rather reasonable assumption that whenever a quantum system is in
an eigenstate, then it really does have the property associated with the cor-
responding eigenvalue. This is a Minimal Property Ascription Condition, in a
formulation taken from Muller and Saunders [13, p.513]:
The minimal property attribution condition: If a system is in an eigenstate of
an operator with eigenvalue v, then the system has the qualitative prop-
erty corresponding to such value of the observable.
Notice that this puts a fairly weak condition for us to attribute properties to
quantum systems: when in an eigenstate, we can surely say the system has
the associated property. This is only half of the famous eigenstate-eigenvalue
link. But what happens when the system is not in an eigenstate, when it is in
a superposition? The condition is silent about that. One can complement the
minimal condition in a variety of ways, for instance, by claiming that when
not in an eigenstate the system does not have any of the properties associated
with the superposition. This option is compatible with the claim that states in
a superposition are contraries: both fail to be the case. Or instead of adopting
this position, one can assume another interpretation, such as modal interpre-
tations, and hold that even in a superposition one of the associated properties
hold, even if not in an eigenstate (see Lombardi and Dieks [11]). Following this
second option, notice, the understanding of superpositions as contraries still
hold: even when one of the properties in a superposition hold, the other must
not be the case.
So, the idea that states in a superposition are contrary rather than contradic-
tory are compatible with a variety of interpretational moves. It is compatible
with assuming only the minimal property attribution condition. The paracon-
sistent approach, on the other hand, introduces a further interpretational pos-
tulate, a kind of converse for the minimal condition according to which every
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superposition corresponds to properties attributed simultaneously to the sys-
tem (see [1]):
Paraconsistent property attribution: When in a superposition, the system does
have the properties related to the vectors forming the superposition, and
they are contradictory.
This move, obviously, closes some alternative interpretation which are also
plausible candidates. So, it seems, this is a further advantage of dealing with
superpositions as contraries: one leaves open some important issues that are
still hot issues of interpretation in quantum mechanics, while the paraconsis-
tent property attribution seems to put a priori constraints on the theory and its
future developments.
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